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out of account, how many sensible people could be expected to ‘side with the
ethical’ even in this minimal way? Would it not reflect something of an obsession,
perhaps even an aﬄiction?
University of Leeds C M C
Ethics Without Principles. B J D. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, . Pp. x
+ . Price £..)
In his preface, Dancy introduces his book as ‘the culmination of twenty-five years’
work’ (p. vii), and it is a fitting testament to that philosophical lifetime that Dancy
can present his case for the theory of particularism which he has championed with
the tables turned on his old foe, generalism. Dancy not only attacks the view that
‘the very possibility of moral thought and judgement depends on the provision of a
suitable supply of moral principles’ (p. ), but asks why, once we have given the
matter some thought, we should even be tempted to think that it does. Generalism is
forced to question its raison d’être.
The book is highly personal; and such a first-personal statement, with its dry
humour, its wry reflections on the path that has led the author to this point, and its
perspectival declarations on the state of knowledge and debate, is far more engaging
to read than an impersonal ‘things are thus and so’. It is clear, thoughtful, and
closely argued with force and honesty.
The book is in three parts. Part I considers the theory of reasons. This is because,
Dancy claims, most errors of generalism stem from errors in the theory of reasons.
He defends a theory of contributory reasons, features that ‘make a case for acting’ in
a particular way, but which can combine with other such features to strengthen the
case (p. ). Such reasons, he argues, cannot be understood as derivative from what
we have ‘overall reason’ to do; instead, the latter is simply a ‘verdict’ on how the
contributory reasons lie in the particular case. Contributory reasons must therefore
be understood in their own terms, which is that of ‘favouring’: a reason for an action
is a feature that ‘favours’ doing that action. No one can give an explicit account of
favouring, but Dancy seeks to convince us that we already have a good grasp of the
concept, and then to argue that any meta-ethical theory which cannot make good
sense of contributory reasons is in trouble.
His aim, developed in part II, is to use his theory of contributory reasons to
defend a very strong form of holism about reasons, viz that ‘a feature that is a reason
in one case may be no reason at all, or an opposite reason, in another’ (p. ). It is the
additional clause ‘or an opposite reason’ which has caused a great deal of fuss, for
this type of holism goes a long way towards establishing particularism. In a matter of
five pages (pp. –), Dancy sets out the heart of the argument that the clause is
correct – from practical examples, the holistic functioning of theoretical and
aesthetic reasons, and the lack of need for invariant reasons. Generalism, however,
must be committed to rejecting it, since principles require reasons that are invariant.
If the principle ‘Lying is wrong’ is right, then it must be because I always have reason
not to lie. Whatever makes lying wrong will always make lying wrong. If the very same
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considerations can sometimes favour lying and sometimes disfavour it, depending on
context, it would be impossible to establish the principle. The longer argument for
holism takes the form of two chapters, one a response to criticism, the other an
attack on the alternatives. Together they present an admirable survey of the
contemporary debate and represent Dancy’s most forceful statement of why he,
holism and therefore particularism are right.
Holism does not make principles or invariant reasons impossible, but the boot is
now on the other foot: having accepted holism, we not only need some argument for
thinking that we could have such a set of principles that would cover a sufficiently
wide-ranging number of cases to form the core of morality, we also need an
argument as to why we should set off in search of them. Dancy considers and rejects
a number of such arguments for the necessity of principles, from the theoretical
requirements of non-cognitivism to social cohesion. Critics will no doubt continue to
produce further reasons to believe in generalism, and can continue to appeal to a
number of arguments which Dancy dismisses rather rapidly. For example, he con-
siders Roger Crisp’s defence, that the unity of the virtues entails that reasons stem-
ming from the virtues, e.g., being merciful, just, benevolent, will be invariant (p. )
– mercy cannot make an act wrong, since such an act would not be properly
merciful. A good part of Dancy’s response is simply to reject the unity of the virtues.
However, he holds out to generalism the olive branch of a ‘default reason’, ‘a
consideration which is reason-giving [with the same polarity] unless something pre-
vents it from being so’ (p. ). This sugars the bitterness of particularism for those
who have not yet acquired the taste. It captures such truth as there is in moral
generalizations; and it is employed against all those who want to say ‘Surely F [e.g.,
justice, or causing unnecessary pain to unwilling innocents] is always a reason in
favour of/against an act’. Such invariant reasons are not impossible; but they are
very much the exception rather than the rule, are not invariant in structure even if
they are in each case so far, and their invariance is unnecessary for moral thought.
Without principles, Dancy needs a robust theory of judgement, and the last
chapter of part II and much of part III spells out this theory, while applying
particularism to the theory of value. The central claim is that what a competent
judge of reasons knows is a type of know-how: it is the knowledge of the ‘sort of
differences’ which reasons make to the situations in which they appear. In terms
of concepts, ‘to grasp the practical purport of a [practical] concept ... is to grasp how
its applicability in a given case affects what one ought to do’ (pp. –). As this can
differ from case to case, one must know the sort of difference it can make to be a
competent judge (this connects back to the idea of a default reason). But ‘the sort of
difference’ is not something that can be articulated, and Dancy is further tempted
to say that ‘our sense that something is a reason is absolutely underivative and
immediate’ (pp. –).
Lest this inarticulate intuitionism is too threatening to contemplate, Dancy finds a
convincing and more widely accepted ‘companion in guilt’ in the theory of meaning.
He draws on Stanley Cavell’s work to argue that our competence with mean-
ing does not require that words or sentences have invariant meaning, nor that
meaning is rule-governed, nor that we infer the meaning of greater wholes from
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lesser parts. The book ends, to the delight of anyone who has found the dictates of
rational choice theory quite alien to the practice of making rational choices, with a
critical discussion of a number of shibboleths regarding the rational requirements on
valuing alternatives.
The support for generalism which will live on, I suspect, is that Dancy’s theory of
judgement simply does not make our evaluative practices sufficiently ‘rational’. But
it will be a challenge to state why we should or could expect more of ‘reason’
without begging the question against particularism. As Dancy explicitly notes, his is
a theory of reasons that can apply across the board. We have been presented with a
closely worked theory of what human rationality is. It will be essential reading for all
those working in meta-ethics and the theory of reasons more generally.
Heythrop College, University of London M L
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